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DEMOCRATIZING AMERICA THROUGH LAW*
Cass R. Sunsteint
Our system of government is ineffective, inefficient, and undemocratic.
Current institutions are the source of these problems. Without great dif-
ficulty, legal reforms could dramatically improve these institutions.
I propose three such reforms. First, government should rely much
more than it does now on the provision of information, on disclosure,
and on education. Second, economic incentives should replace the com-
mand-and-control regulation that has become so characteristic of our
governmental institutions. Third, the law should promote more decen-
tralization in the private and public spheres, allowing greater flexibility
for states and localities, for employers, and for workers.
In recent decades, prescriptions of this general sort have been set out
by economists with considerable care and clarity. There can be no doubt
that legal initiatives in these directions would increase the efficiency of
contemporary government; they would also help guarantee that regula-
tion is actually effective in accomplishing its goals. These would be large
improvements, especially in a period in which American industries must
compete in increasingly international markets. I will therefore devote
considerable attention to explaining how efficiency and efficacy might be
brought about by legal reforms.
It is important to emphasize, however, that we are in the midst of a
period in which much of the world has been embarking on the task of
democratization. In such a period, it would be especially odd to concen-
trate our regulatory efforts on efficiency and efficacy alone. This is so
particularly in light of the fact that from the standpoint of democratic
theory, the contemporary American system of public law is nothing to
celebrate. Democratic deliberation on the central issues is discouragingly
rare. Sensationalistic anecdotes often dominate public debate. Powerful
interest groups-on the left, right, and center-exert excessive influence
over regulatory policy. Real participation in the public and private
* This essay is derived from a lecture Professor Sunstein delivered December 5, 1991, as
part of the Donahue Lecture Series. The Donahue Lecture Series is a program instituted by
the Suffolk University Law Review to commemorate the Honorable Frank J. Donahue, former
faculty member, trustee, and treasurer of Suffolk University. The Lecture Series serves as a
tribute to Judge Donahue's accomplishments in encouraging academic excellence at Suffolk
University Law School. Each lecture in the series is designed to address contemporary legal
issues and expose the Suffolk University community to outstanding authorities in various fields
of law.
t The author is the Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago
Law School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. He gratefully ac-
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spheres is at best episodic. In this light, few matters deserve higher prior-
ity than institutional changes designed to increase the democratic charac-
ter of the modem state.
I claim here that the three general reforms would promote not only
efficiency and efficacy, but democracy as well. Strategies of disclosure
and education are the precondition for a well-functioning democratic
process. Without information, people cannot carry out their roles as citi-
zens. Economic incentives have the fortunate consequence of requiring
participants in the democratic process to focus on the key question: How
much reduction in (say) risk do we want, and at what price? By contrast,
existing approaches tend to distract attention from that question, and to
direct it toward other issues that are at once less relevant and less intelli-
gible. Decentralization is, under current conditions, an indispensable
part of any strategy for democratization. The national government is
simply too remote for general citizen control.
The reforms for economic efficiency therefore go hand-in-hand with
reforms for democratization. To be sure, we will at some stage have to
make some difficult choices between efficiency and democracy.' But for
the next generation, the three fundamental changes will bring about pow-
erful movements in both directions.
In this essay I will be painting with an extremely broad brush.2 My
aim is to set out the very general contours of reform strategies. In order
to do this, the discussion of particular questions will have to be greatly
compressed. In the near future, of course, the particulars will deserve
much greater detail. I sacrifice attention to specifics with the under-
standing that in thinking about reform of American public law, the gen-
eral defects of the system have been lost too often, in favor of discussion
of unnecessarily incremental changes.
This essay has four parts. In Part I, I discuss the rise of the modem
regulatory state, with particular reference to the New Deal period. Here
I explore how the New Deal attempted simultaneously to increase eco-
nomic efficiency and to promote democratization-and how it failed, in
important respects, on both counts. In Part II, I explore the current
state of regulatory government. I attempt to show its multiple inefficien-
cies and to say something about the consequences of those inefficiencies
for the economy. I also explain why the current system of public law
fails from the democratic point of view. In Part III, I outline remedies
for the current situation, arguing that across a broad range, the goals of
1. See infra section IV-D.
2. See also Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, on which I draw for
some sections of this essay.
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economic efficiency and democratization are entirely compatible. Part
IV offers some significant qualifications to this general claim.
I. THE NEW DEAL
President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, undertaken in the 1930s,
represented a fundamental restructuring of the American legal system.
Some people think that it amounted to a kind of constitutional amend-
ment.' We need not go so far in order to recognize its foundational sta-
tus in modem American government.
The New Deal operated against a well-defined constitutional back-
drop.4 That backdrop included the three basic cornerstones of the Amer-
ican legal system: checks and balances; federalism; and individual rights.
The New Dealers viewed all of these in the context of the Great Depres-
sion, which left huge numbers of Americans out of work. In that con-
text, the New Dealers thought that the pre-existing system of individual
rights protected both too little and too much. That system consisted
largely of the common-law catalogue of rights "against" government, in-
cluding most notably private property and freedom of contract.
For the New Dealers, this catalogue protected too much, since it im-
munized existing holdings of property from democratic control. Not
everything that people had, under the common law, was genuinely enti-
tled to legal protection. The pre-existing system of rights also protected
too little, since it furnished no safeguards against the various hazards of
the market economy, including unemployment, homelessness, disability,
and disease.
The emerging conception of rights called for redistribution of various
kinds and also for recognition of a novel category of protected interests.
The ultimate result was President Roosevelt's second Bill of Rights, in-
cluding "the right to a useful and remunerative job," "the right to earn
enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation," "the right
of every family to a decent home," "the right to adequate medical care
and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health," "the right to
adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, acci-
dent, and unemployment," and "the right to a good education."5
Institutional changes followed from these ideas. Against the backdrop
3. See B. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991) (discussing the New Deal as a constitu-
tional amendment).
4. See C. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1990) (describing original
framework of Constitution); Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 421 (1987) (same).
5. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, in 13 THE PUnLIC PA-
PERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 41 (1969) (speech delivered Jan. 11,
1944).
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of the new conception of rights, the original system of checks and bal-
ances seemed anachronistic.6 Far from a precious safeguard of liberty
from government, that system appeared an unnecessary constraint on
democratic action designed to promote economic productivity and to
protect the disadvantaged. The most radical attacks on checks and bal-
ances-including The Coming American Fascism,' a publication intended
not as a warning but rather as an optimistic statement of the wonderful
things to come-were rejected. But the attack on the system of checks
and balances did have two enduring legacies. It helped produce a con-
centration of judicial and lawmaking power in the presidency, which was
no longer restricted to execution of the laws, narrowly understood.' It
also contributed to the New Deal enthusiasm for "independent" agen-
cies. These novel entities combined traditionally separated functions and
were immunized from direct control by any of the constitutionally speci-
fied branches.
Under the New Deal reformation, the system of federalism fared little
better. Those who produced the original framework envisioned states as
an obstacle to national action,9 and also as an arena for democratic self-
determination. For the New Dealers, the states were not a guarantor of
freedom, but on the contrary a barrier to necessary social change. A
redirection of authority from the states to the national government was
indispensable if public officials were to carry out their new tasks. Greatly
expanded national power, mostly under the commerce clause, was the
result.
Once authority was thus redirected, there was no doubt that the presi-
dency would be the principal beneficiary. In a single bold stroke,
Roosevelt united the Hamiltonian belief in an energetic executive with
the Jeffersonian belief in collective self-determination. The presidency
became the focal point for democratic self-governance.
In the New Deal period, the belief in economic productivity and the
belief in democracy were thoroughly merged. New institutions were nec-
essary above all to improve the operation of the economy-increasing
business confidence, providing the preconditions for stock markets, en-
suring people of the stability of banks, managing the business cycle, and
protecting farmers against undue economic fluctuations. Eventually
spurred by Keynesian economics, the New Deal understanding of the
role of the state was centered on the goal of economic prosperity.
Roosevelt's program is often associated with protection of the disadvan-
6. See R. TUGWELL, THE BATTLE FOR DEMOCRACY (1935).
7. See L. DENNIS, THE COMING AMERICAN FASCISM (1939) (arguing for fascism in
America).
8. See T. Lowi, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT (1985) (describing changes in presidency).
9. See THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 239 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield 2d ed. 1966).
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taged, and this idea was indeed central to him.'° But government assur-
ance of the successful performance of the economy was the principal goal
of the New Deal reforms.
This idea did not conflict with democratic ideals. On the contrary, the
market system that preceded the New Deal was subject to sustained chal-
lenges in this period, precisely on democratic grounds. Before the rise of
modern regulatory institutions, common-law courts, which were hardly
accountable to the people, created much of the basic system of govern-
ance. Thus the law of property, tort, and contract was a crucial regula-
tory system. It had been created by the unelected judiciary.
In the early part of the century, courts went so far as to interpret the
Constitution as embodying common-law principles." In this way they
immunized the common law from democratic control. By contrast, the
new entities created by the New Deal were intended to be popularly ac-
countable. Indeed, those entities would be supervised by the people in
ways that would lead to large gains in democratic self-governance. Thus
it was that the belief in economic prosperity and democratic government
marched hand-in-hand.
Contemporary governmental structures are best understood as an out-
growth of the New Deal reformation. Our current system is not, of
course, by any means identical with what emerged from the New Deal
period. There have been occasional bursts of governmental activity and
retrenchment, and these have been quite important. Above all, the
"rights revolution" of the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed an ex-
traordinary growth of new regulatory entities, rivalling the New Deal
itself in scope and importance.' 2 Of particular interest was the creation
of institutions designed to reduce risks in consumer products, the work-
place, and the natural environment.
Here the rhetoric of "rights" and "redistribution" accompanied the
claims of democracy and efficiency. The new entities were supposed to
protect the "right" to a safe workplace, an unpolluted atmosphere, and
in clean water-and also to shift resources from (among others) employ-
ers to employees. Both economic and democratic goals were important
here as well. The new institutions were supposed to remove a substantial
drain on the economy, and also to reflect democratic judgments about
risk reduction.
Much the same can be said about the new attack, prominent since the
10. See K. DAVIS, FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS, 1933-1937 (1986) (discussing
Roosevelt's reaction to invalidation of National Industrial Recovery Act and support for child
labor, minimum wage, maximum hours, and collective bargaining measures).
11. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating law addressing maximum
hours of work).
12. See C. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1990).
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1960s, on discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and disability. Dis-
crimination has been challenged as a barrier to economic productivity
and to the political equality so crucial to democratic principles. In the
area of civil rights, economic and democratic aspirations played a central
and complementary role.
At least since the election of President Reagan in 1980, we have been
in a period of retrenchment, in which New Deal reforms have often been
rethought in favor of renewed attention to the capacities of private mar-
kets. The enforcement practices of federal agencies have been signifi-
cantly changed as a result. But there has been no fundamental
rethinking of current institutions. The changes have been largely
incremental.
II. THE STATUS Quo
How has our system of public law actually performed? Has it pro-
moted economic prosperity and democratic governance? We now have
considerable evidence on both scores. And while there have been some
significant successes,"l much of the overall story is dismaying.
A. Inefficiency
The current system of public law has been extraordinarily inefficient.
The annual net cost of regulation has been estimated at between $44 and
$200 billion. 4 There is no question that we need not spend this amount
for the benefits we actually receive.
So-called economic regulation-calling for price and entry controls in
various sectors of the economy-produced unnecessary and exorbitant
costs for American consumers. Thus it is estimated that airline deregula-
tion yielded gains to airlines and travellers of about $15 billion annu-
ally.'5 The corresponding numbers for trucking deregulation and
railroad deregulation were $30 billion and $15 billion. 6 The Natural
Gas Act, which allowed government control of gasoline prices, certainly
contributed to the dangerous gas shortages of the 1970s.' 7 The resulting
inefficiencies led to decreases in industrial production, losses of hundreds
13. See Sunstein, Administrative Substance, supra note 2.
14. See Hahn & Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 247
(1991) (net cost of regulation estimated at $44 billion). For references to other studies, and a
suggestion that this is far too low, see The Total Cost of Regulation?, REGULATION, Summer
1991, at 22-25. The Office of Management and Budget makes an estimate of between $50 and
$150 billion. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE
UNITED STATES-APRIL 1, 1987-MARCH 31, 1988, at xii (1987).
15. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED
STATES-APRIL 1, 1989-MARCH 31, 1990, at 6 & citations therein (1989).
16. Id.
17. See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
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of thousands of jobs, and reductions in the supply of gas for millions of
Americans. 18
Nor are inefficiencies limited to the area of economic regulation. The
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has delayed the entry of benefi-
cial foods and drugs into the market, significantly increasing risks to
safety and health.' 9 The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) fuel
economy standards appear to have produced uncertain gains in light of
the fact that manufacturers were in any case moving to smaller and more
efficient cars; but they did lead to significant losses in lives as a result of
producing more dangerous, lighter vehicles.2 ° The United States spent
no less than $632 billion for pollution control between 1972 and 1985.21
Some studies suggest that alternative strategies could have achieved the
same gains at less than one-quarter of the cost. 22
So much for the facts. What is the cause of the current situation? A
pervasive source of regulatory inefficiency in the United States is the use
of rigid, highly bureaucratized "command and control" regulation,
which dictates, at the national level, control strategies for hundreds,
thousands, or millions of companies and individuals in an exceptionally
diverse nation. Command and control regulation is a dominant part of
American government in such areas as environmental protection and oc-
cupational safety and health.
In the environmental context, command and control approaches usu-
ally take the form of regulatory requirements of the "best available tech-
nology" (BAT), which are almost always imposed only on new pollution
sources. BAT strategies are pervasive in federal law. Indeed, they are a
defining characteristic of regulation of the air, the water, and conditions
in the workplace.23
One of the many problems with BAT strategies is that they ignore the
enormous differences among plants and industries and among geographi-
cal areas. In view of these differences, it is wildly inefficient to impose
nationally uniform technological requirements. It does not seem sensible
to impose the same technology on industries in diverse areas-regardless
of whether they are polluted or clean, populated or empty, or expensive
or cheap to clean up.
There are other sources of inefficiency as well. BAT strategies require
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., H. GRABOWSKI & J. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS
(1983) (discussing harmful effects of FDA screening).
20. See R. CRANDALL, REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE (1986).
21. See T. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING 41-45 (1985).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)(C) (1988) (Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1)
(1988) (Clean Water Act).
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all new industries to adopt costly technology, and allow imposition of
more lenient standards on existing plants and industries. Through this
route BAT strategies actually penalize new products, thus discouraging
investment and perpetuating old, dirty technology. The result is ineffi-
ciency in investment strategies, in innovation, and even in environmental
protection.
Such strategies also fail to encourage the development of new pollution
control technology, and indeed, serve to discourage it by requiring its
adoption for no financial gain. Under the BAT approach, a company
that innovates will simply have to invest more in pollution control. It
will be punished rather than rewarded for the development of new con-
trol technology. BAT strategies are also extremely expensive to enforce,
imposing on the EPA and the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA) an extraordinary monitoring burden.
Additional inefficiency stems from the fact that BAT approaches focus
on the technology at the end of the pipe. This is merely a way of aiming
at symptoms rather than underlying causes of pollution. For example,
sulfur dioxide emissions (the major source of acid rain) are controlled by
forcing coal-fired power plants to adopt costly "scrubbing" strategies. A
much cheaper method of control is to encourage companies to switch to
cleaner coal.24
In general, governmental specification of the means of achieving de-
sired ends is a good way of producing inefficiency. Instead of permitting
industry and consumers to choose the "means"-and thus to impose a
form of market discipline on that question-we often select the means in
advance. The governmentally-prescribed means is often the inefficient
one.
Other inefficiencies in existing law stem from inadequate attention to
the problem of incentives. Consider, for example, the Superfund statute,
which was created to deal with the problem of abandoned toxic waste
dumps. Congress' basic strategy was to impose joint and several liability
on everyone connected with the dump in question-managers or owners
of the site, generators of the waste, and transporters. 25 At first glance,
the strategy seems both fair and efficient: fair, because it imposes cleanup
duties on everyone; efficient, because it is likely to deter everyone from
contributing to the problem of abandoned waste sites.
A predictable consequence of this strategy is to produce incentives, not
to clean up, but instead to have protracted litigation on the liability ques-
tion. If everyone is liable, it is almost as bad as if no one is. The liability
24. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981) (discussing in-
terest group pressures behind Clean Air Act).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
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of each person is effectively "decreased" by virtue of the sheer numbers
of people who are liable as well. For each person, contemplating possible
courses of action, liability must be understood in the context of a situa-
tion in which many other people will be liable too. If hundreds of people
are subject to suit, one can be sure that there will be endless litigation on
the liability question. Thus it is that on average, seven years and at least
$4 million in transactions costs are necessary before final clean-up even
begins.26
More generally, studies of the costs and benefits of regulatory pro-
grams show a crazy-quilt pattern, including both too much and too little
regulation. Consider, for example, expenditures per life saved.2 ' There
is now considerable data on the amount of money spent to save lives in
various government programs. Some programs pay for themselves in
terms of health and related savings. The lives saved are purely a bonus,
in the sense that they come for free. Other programs cost between
$100,000 and $300,000 per life saved-surely an amount well worth
spending. But still other programs cost $89 million per life saved, $92
million per life saved, even $132 million per life saved. To be sure, some
disparities, even significant ones, might well be expected in a democ-
racy.28 But it is difficult to believe that these differences reflect anything
but interest-group power and irrationality of various sorts. In any case,
they are highly inefficient.
This brief summary should be sufficient to suggest that from the stand-
point of efficiency, much of modern government is ill-directed. Some
programs are not beneficial at all. Others have unnecessary and costly
side-effects. We could obtain the same benefits much more cheaply.
Sometimes inefficiency in government, particularly when described by
economists, seems a dry and technical matter. But the consequences of
the status quo are anything but technical. They include a range of ad-
verse effects on human beings: excessively high prices, greater unem-
ployment, lower benefits in terms of safety and health, more poverty, and
increased difficulty for American companies and workers attempting to
compete in an increasingly international market.
B. Democracy
The New Deal aspired not only to greater efficiency but also to more
democracy. The New Dealers hoped for a system in which citizens and
representatives, operating through responsive but expert organs, would
26. See Elliott, Superfund: EPA Success National Debacle?, NAT. RESOURCES AND
ENV'T (forthcoming 1992).
27. See Morrall, A Review of the Record, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 25.
28. See Pildes & Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value
Pluralism and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2121 (1990).
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make deliberate decisions about the basic system of public law. In place
of the undemocratic; ad hoc systems of common-law ordering and judge-
made constitutionalism, new regulatory institutions would be subject to
political will and carry out public instructions. The new regime was to
combine a high degree of accountability with a high degree of
deliberation.
In practice, this democratic aspiration has often been defeated. People
rarely have enough information to participate at all, or at all well, in the
processes of government. The extraordinary concentration of regulation
in Washington has hampered democratic deliberation both in localities
and in the private sphere. The use of complex technological mecha-
nisms, and their centrality to actual outcomes, have contributed to the
power of well-organized interest groups over the regulatory process.
Thus it is that the New Deal has helped bring about a kind of Madis-
onian nightmare of government by faction.29
Democratic failures have often been documented.3 ° The BAT ap-
proach, for example, is severely deficient from the standpoint of a well-
functioning political process. That approach ensures that citizens and
representatives will be focussing their attention not on what levels of re-
duction are appropriate, but instead on the largely incidental and nearly
impenetrable question of what technologies are now available.3' Because
of its sheer complexity, this issue is not easily subject to democratic reso-
lution. Moreover, the issue is not the relevant one for democratic poli-
tics, which is the appropriate degree and nature of environmental
protection-an issue to which the BAT question is only indirectly
related.
The focus on the question of "means" also tends to increase the power
of well-organized private groups, by allowing them to press environmen-
tal and regulatory law in the service of their own parochial ends. These
ends include, for example, the promotion of ethanol, which is helpful to
corn farmers though not necessarily to environmental protection; other
fuels might well be preferable on environmental grounds. Ends favored
by parochial interests also include governmentally-compelled use of coal
"scrubbers," which are helpful to eastern coal, although not necessarily
to air quality. The use of already-clean coal might well be better.32
In this respect, the BAT strategy is emblematic of a far more general
29. See Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHIi. L. REV. 335 (1990) (describing faction-
alizing of regulatory policy).
30. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 24; R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION
AND THE COURTS (1983).
31. See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for
Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988).
32. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 24.
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problem in current regulation. Centralization at the national level dimin-
ishes opportunities for citizen participation. It promotes intense and un-
productive struggles among well-organized factions. Education of
citizens about the key issues-risk levels and risk comparisons-is at best
episodic. In their capacity as consumers, citizens, workers, or users of
the air and water, people are inadequately informed of the risks that they
face. Public attention tends to be focussed on particular incidents, which
are gripping and sensationalistic, but often misleading.
In these circumstances, it is difficult to ensure that citizens and repre-
sentatives will be involved in deliberating about different strategies for
achieving social goals, or for deciding what those goals are in the first
place. By directing attention to means, the system also creates powerful
incentives for interest groups to ensure that they are favored in the legis-
lature or the bureaucracy. Thus it is that current institutions cannot
carry out Roosevelt's goal of linking the Hamiltonian commitment to an
energetic executive with the Jeffersonian belief in self-government. The
democratic aspirations of the New Deal have largely been defeated.
III. REMEDIES
It would be most fortunate if the inefficiencies in current regulation
could be remedied through reform strategies that simultaneously pro-
moted democratic government. In this section, I argue that the same
reforms that would increase efficiency would indeed promote democracy.
I deal with three such reforms: disclosure and education; economic in-
centives; and decentralization.
A. Disclosure and Education
Many Americans are unaware of the risks that they face in day-to-day
life. Often workers do not know about toxic substances in workplaces, or
about the risks that they cause. Consumers of ordinary foods are unable
to evaluate the dangers posed by fats, calcium, sugar, and salt. People in
small communities do not know that toxic waste dumping has occurred;
and if they know the facts, they do not know the risks.
Scenarios of this sort are especially likely in light of the fact that ordi-
nary people have a difficult time obtaining information about risk. Cau-
sation is extremely complex here, and accurate inferences are extremely
difficult to draw. Often risks take many years to materialize. Individual
susceptibility varies. Changing technology makes learning from the past
a hazardous enterprise. 3
It would be reasonable to say that in cases of this sort, the interest in
33. See Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics-And the New Administrative
State, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 356 (1988).
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freedom or autonomy-quite apart from efficiency and democracy-re-
quires a governmental remedy. Knowing choices are a precondition for
liberty. Claims from efficiency and democracy argue in the same direc-
tion.34 Disclosure by the government itself, or by others at the govern-
ment's behest, will often promote both efficiency and democracy.
1. Efficiency
When information is lacking, there may well be a conventional case of
market failure under economic criteria.35 To be sure, information-like
other goods-is a scarce commodity. Perhaps the market has produced
the optimal level of information. The optimal level is not complete infor-
mation. If so, there is no market failure-even if there might be a prob-
lem under noneconomic criteria. But there are several reasons why the
market for information may indeed fail.
First, information is sometimes a public good. Once it is available at
all, or to anyone, it is available to everyone or to many people. People
can thus capture the benefits of information without having to pay for its
production. Once created, a report discussing the risks posed by carcino-
gens in the workforce may well benefit employees a great deal-but no
individual employee has the right incentive to pay his proportional share
for the report. Each employee has the incentive to "free ride" on the
efforts of others. The result is that too little information will be
forthcoming.
The point applies to materials about shared risks in general. Indeed,
the point applies to materials about all information of shared importance.
It suggests that there is a strong prima facie case, on economic grounds,
for governmental interference in the information market.
Second, manufacturers may have poor incentives to provide informa-
tion about hazardous products. Competition over the extent of danger
may decrease total purchases of the product rather than help any partic-
ular manufacturer obtain greater sales. The phenomenon has sometimes
played a role in discouraging competition over safety among manufactur-
ers of tobacco products. At least in principle, the phenomenon may oc-
cur frequently.36
Information asymmetries may produce a "lemons" problem, in which
34. A qualification is necessary here. By offering more information than is efficient, the
government may create inefficiency. By providing information, however, the government pro-
motes a certain conception of liberty.
35. See P. ASCH, CONSUMER SAFETY REGULATION (1988); Rose-Ackerman, supra note
33, at 356.
36. There are, however, many cases in which companies compete over safety, and in this
sense the market often works as an effective check on dangerous products.
[Vol. XXV:949
HeinOnline  -- 25 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 960 1991
DEMOCRATIZING AMERICA
dangerous products drive safe ones out of the market.37 Imagine, for
example, that producers know which products are safe, but that consum-
ers cannot tell. Safe products may not be able to compete if they sell for
no higher price than dangerous ones, if safe products are more expensive
to produce, and if consumers are unable to tell the difference. In that
case, the fact that sellers have information, while buyers do not, will en-
sure that "lemons"-here dangerous products-will dominate the mar-
ket. Regulation designed to provide information is the proper remedy.
All this suggests that there is frequently a market failure in the provi-
sion of information. At least as a presumptive matter, government reme-
dies are an appropriate response. These remedies might take the form of
governmentally-provided information, education campaigns, or disclo-
sure requirements. Strictly on economic grounds, there is much to be
said in favor of these remedies. They may fortify the operation of the
marketplace. They may be a precondition for free choice, the back-
ground goal of free markets.
We now have a good deal of empirical information about disclosure of
risks. In general, the information suggests that disclosure can be a help-
ful and cost-effective strategy.38 Workers do indeed respond to new in-
formation about risks, quitting or demanding higher salaries. Consumers
often react well to the disclosure about danger levels. In general, there is
every reason to think that governmentally-mandated disclosure, if suita-
bly designed, is an effective mechanism for promoting economic
efficiency.
2. Democracy
Suppose that we wanted to increase the democratic character of con-
temporary government, by promoting citizen participation in, and con-
trol over, governmental processes. A good initial step would be for
government to provide enough information so that people can make
knowledgeable judgments.
Government might itself supply information, or require disclosure by
private citizens and companies. Return, for example, to the matter of
expenditures per life saved.39 There is now considerable data on the
amount of money spent to save lives in various government programs.
37. See Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons" Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
38. See Viscusi, Magat & Huber, Informational Regulation of Consumer Health Risks: An
Empirical Evaluation of Health Warnings, 17 RAND J. EON. 351 (1986); Viscusi & O'Connor,
Adaptive Responses to Chemical Labelling: Are Workers Bayesian Decision Makers?, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 942 (1984); see also W. KiP Viscusi, W. MAGAT & J. HUBER, LEARNING ABOUT
RISK (1987).
39. See Morrall, supra note 27 (cataloging expenditures per life saved).
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As we have seen, what emerges is a crazy-quilt. Some programs pay for
themselves in terms of health and related savings; others are extremely
hard to defend. At the very least, the American public should be in-
formed of these disparities so that it can evaluate them. Provision of
information about the content and expense of regulatory programs
should be high on the governmental agenda.
Or consider the question of risk regulation in general. On that ques-
tion, people are poorly informed.' For example, they appear not to
know that the risks of nuclear power are substantially smaller than the
risks posed by other energy sources. They appear not to have a clear
sense of the relationships among different risks that are confronted in
everyday life. Smoking, for example, produces 345,000 deaths per year,
an annual risk of 3.0 in 103; all occupations produce between 11,000 and
200,000 annual deaths, an annual risk of 1.1 to 20 in 10'; and boxing
produces only three deaths a year, an annual risk of 5.4 in 10".
Information of this sort ought to be widely available. The fact that it
is not creates a significant failure in government regulation. At least
equally important, it presents a large obstacle to citizenship. The prob-
lem appears in the private sector, in local government, and at the state
and national levels. Workers uninformed of risks are unable to partici-
pate usefully in the process of deciding among different possible levels of
workplace safety. Local communities, deciding whether to allow toxic
waste sites or plants that produce sulfur dioxide, need to be in a position
to make informed choices.
A large virtue of a federal system is that it permits different states,
having different values, to make different choices about social arrange-
ments. In the context at hand, many decisions about the relations among
industrial development, employment, pollution, and risk must be made at
the state or local level. An absence of information is a severe obstacle to
this process. The same is true at the national level, where sensational
anecdotes displace reasoned analysis of the alternatives.
The most general way to put the point is to note that on the framers'
view, America was to be a deliberative democracy, in which representa-
tives, accountable to the people, would make decisions through a process
of deliberation uncontrolled by private factions.4 Without better infor-
mation, neither deliberation nor democracy is possible. Legal reforms
designed to remedy the situation are a precondition for democratic
politics.
40. Some of this is undoubtedly a product of heuristics of various sorts. But more infor-
mation could help overcome some of the relevant biases.
41. See Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in American Government
in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 102 (1980); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10,
at 16 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield 2d ed. 1966).
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3. Current Steps
The national government has started a series of steps in the right direc-
tion. Mandatory messages about risks from cigarette smoking, first set
out in 1965 and modified in 1969 and 1984, are the most familiar exam-
ple.42 The FDA has long maintained a policy of requiring risk labels for
pharmaceutical products. 43 The EPA has done the same for pesticides
and asbestos." There are numerous other illustrations. Indeed, the ef-
fort to provide information counts as one of the most striking, if incipi-
ent, developments in modern regulatory law. Three recent initiatives are
especially notable.
In 1983, the OSHA issued a Hazard Communication Standard
(HCS), 45 applicable to the manufacturing sector. In 1986, the HCS was
made generally applicable. Under the HCS, chemical producers and im-
porters must evaluate the hazards of the chemicals they produce or im-
port; develop technical hazard information for materials safety data
sheets, and labels for hazardous substances; and, most important, trans-
mit this information to users of the relevant substances. All employers
must adopt a hazard communication program-including individual
training-and inform workers of the relevant risks.
In 1986, Congress enacted an ambitious new statute, the Emergency
Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRKA).46 Under this
statute, firms and individuals must report, to state and local government,
the quantities of potentially hazardous chemicals that have been stored
or released into the environment. Users of such chemicals must report to
their local fire departments about the location, types, and quantities of
stored chemicals. They must also give information about potential ad-
verse health effects. A detailed report suggests that EPCRKA has had
important beneficial effects, spurring innovative, cost-effective programs
from the EPA and from state and local government.47
The FDA has also adopted informational strategies. In its most ambi-
tious set of proposals, the FDA seeks: (a) to compel nutritional labelling
on nearly all processed foods, including information relating to choles-
terol, saturated fat, calories from fat, and fiber; (b) to require compliance
with government specified serving sizes; (c) to compel companies to con-
form to government definitions of standardized terms, including, "re-
duced," "fresh," "free," and "low;" and (d) to allow health claims only if
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
43. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-360 (1988).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2655 (1988).
45. 29 C.F.R. 1910.1200(g) (1990).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 11,044 (1988),
47. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Toxic CHEMICALS, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
(1991).
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they (1) are supported by scientific evidence and (2) communicate clear
and complete information about such matters as fat and heart disease, fat
and cancer, sodium and high blood pressure, and calcium and
osteoporosis.48
These initiatives are simply a beginning. Broader and more ambitious
programs, coordinating the general communication of social risks, are
very much in order. It has been suggested that government might even-
tually develop a "national warnings system" containing a systematized
terminology for warnings.49 Such a system could apply to all contexts
and risks, and give a uniform sense of risk levels. The existence of a
uniform language would make it possible to assess risks across a wide
range of social spheres.
Most important of all, such a system would perform a vital educative
function, one that could complement the functioning of markets and pro-
vide a necessary precondition for democratic choice. We should ulti-
mately aspire to go far beyond risk regulation, to promote the
dissemination of information bearing on democratic affairs in general.
B. Economic Incentives
By economic incentives, I mean financial penalties imposed on harm-
producing behavior or benefits conferred on harm-reducing behavior.
Such penalties should supplement and even displace command-and-con-
trol regulation.
1. Efficiency
It is inefficient for government to prescribe the means for achieving
social objectives. Ordinarily it would be far better, on economic grounds,
for government to create incentives to engage in socially desirable con-
duct, and to permit the market to decide how companies respond to
those incentives.
It is especially inefficient for government to dictate technology. A far
better approach is to impose a tax on harmful behavior, 0 and to let mar-
ket forces determine the response to the increased cost. Government
should generally impose fees on those who put pollutants into the atmos-
phere-instead of, for example, mandating costly "scrubbing" technol-
48. See 56 Fed. Reg. 60,302 (1991) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 317, 320 & 381) (pro-
posed Nov. 27, 1991).
49. See W. KiP Viscusi, W. MAGAT & J. HUBER, supra note 38, at 155.
50. A Coasian qualification is necessary here: Sometimes the apparent victim of the harm-
ful conduct is in the best position to avoid the harm, and in such cases it is possible to say that
the apparent victim should be charged with taking preventive or remedial measures. An exam-
ple would be a case in which workers could cheaply prevent the costs of a chemical in the
workplace, by wearing masks or clothing that prevent the harm from occurring.
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ogy for sulfur dioxide. Consumption of the harm-producing good will
decline. Producers will shift to less harmful methods of production.
They may, for example, substitute clean for dirty coal.
More generally, government might adopt a simple, two-step reform
policy in the area of social risks and social harms."' First, those who
impose harm must pay for it-by purchasing permission to do so, per-
haps through a licensing procedure. Second, those who obtain the result-
ing permission should be able to trade their "licenses" with other people.
In the pollution context, this would mean that people who reduce their
pollution below a specified level could trade their "pollution rights" for
cash.
In one bold stroke, such a system would create market-based disincen-
tives to pollute and market-based incentives for pollution control. Such a
system would also reward rather than punish technological innovation in
pollution control, and do so with the aid of private markets. Very gener-
ally, and quite outside the environmental area, it makes sense to think
about programs of this sort for regulation of harmful behavior. 2
An idea of this kind might be made part and parcel of a system of
"green taxes." With such a system, we might levy taxes on people who
impose externalities on others-users of dirty automobiles, farmers who
employ pesticides, coal-fired power plants, gasoline that produces air pol-
lution, products that contribute to destruction of the ozone layer or the
greenhouse effect. Tax levies of various sorts are used by many nations
already, though they have been slow in coming to the United States.53
These levies have had, or are projected to have, excellent results. Thus
a higher tax on leaded gasoline in Great Britain increased the market
share of unleaded gas from four to thirty percent in less than a year.54 It
is estimated that a doubling of pesticide prices would cut pesticide use in
half." It is also estimated that a fee of $110 per ton on carbon would
decrease carbon dioxide emissions by twenty percent by the year 2005.56
An important advantage of such strategies is that they would dramati-
cally increase government revenues. This is an especially worthwhile
goal in a period of large deficits. The suggested carbon tax would gener-
51. Here I generalize from the helpful discussion in Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 31
(defending incentive systems).
52. The most controversial application would be civil rights, but even here the proposal
seems plausible. See Mashaw, Implementing Quotas, 79 GEo. L.J. 1769 (1991) (discussing
transferable quota requirements).
53. A study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development found over
50 environmental charges among 14 of its members. See L. BROWN, SAVING THE PLANET
143 (1991).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 146.
56. Id. at 148.
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ate over $130 billion.57 Other such taxes on polluting activity could pro-
duce billions of additional dollars in revenue. 58
Economic incentives could be applied in other areas as well. Workers'
compensation plans, for example, operate as a reasonably effective guar-
antee of workplace safety. According to a recent study, "If the safety
incentives of workers' compensation were removed, fatality rates in the
United States economy would increase by almost 30 percent. Over 1200
more workers would die from job injuries every year in the absence of the
safety incentives provided by workers' compensation." 9 This contrasts
with a mere two to four percent reduction in injuries from OSHA, an
amount that links up well with the fact that annual workers' compensa-
tion premiums are more than 1000 times as large as total annual OSHA
penalties.' The tax system could be used to punish employers who pro-
vide dangerous workplaces.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission could experiment with a
system in which producers of harm-producing products would pay a fee
into the federal treasury. Ultimately, we might hope for a coordinated
system of risk regulation, one that imposed uniform fees for harm-pro-
ducing activities.
2. Democracy
Thus far we have seen that a shift to economic incentives would be
efficient and effective. What consequences would such a shift have for
democratic government?
The answer is that it would have significant consequences, and that
these would be extremely beneficial. 61 The current system puts public
attention in the wrong places. Imagine, for example, that Congress and
the citizenry-following the contemporary model-are asking the ques-
tion whether ethanol, or some other gasoline substitute, should be re-
quired in new cars. It is perfectly predictable that in answering this
question, well-organized groups with a significant stake in the outcome
will bring their influence to bear. It is also predictable that ethanol pro-
ducers may seek and actually obtain regulatory benefits, and for reasons
bearing little or no relationship to environmental protection.
At the same time, the underlying substantive question-whether etha-
nol is actually an environmentally superior product-will have to be re-
solved on the basis of technological complexities not easily addressed by
57. Id. at 145.
58. See L. BROWN, supra note 53, at 145.
59. W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 178 (1991).
60. Id. at 178-79.
61. The point is treated nicely in Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 31, and I draw on their
discussion here.
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the public or its representatives. If this is the issue on which the political
process focusses, we are therefore likely to have a series of laws that rep-
resent, not public-spirited deliberation with a measure of broad accounta-
bility, but instead trade-offs among well-organized private groups, or, in
Madisonian terms, government by faction. By directing attention to
means, this system creates strong incentives for interest groups to ensure
that they are favored in the legislature or the bureaucracy.
Compare a system of economic incentives. Here the issue is not one of
means, but the amount of sulfur dioxide that will be allowed into the
atmosphere-an issue to be resolved in the process of deciding how many
licenses should be given out, and for how much pollution. This shift
would ensure that citizens and representatives would be focussing on
how much pollution reduction there should be, and at what cost. The
right question would be put squarely before the electorate. No longer
would it be possible to pretend that environmental protection is costless.
No longer would the central issue be displaced by the largely incidental
question of means.
Moreover, a system of financial penalties allows far less room for inter-
est-group maneuvering. The large question-how much environmental
protection at what cost--does not readily permit legislators to favor a
well-organized, narrow group, such as the agricultural lobby, or the coal
lobby. Special favors cannot easily be provided through a system of eco-
nomic incentives. The very generality of the question will work against
narrow favoritism. To be sure, the ultimate question of pollution reduc-
tion may be answered in a way that reflects sustained political pressure
rather than democratic deliberation. But the risks are minimized, cer-
tainly as compared with the existing system.
There are other democratic advantages as well. Economic incentives
should simultaneously promote coordination and rationality in regula-
tion, by giving government an incentive to attend closely, and for the first
time, to how other risks are treated. This should bring a salutary mea-
sure of structure and sense to risk regulation in general. As an important
by-product, the new system should create a powerful incentive to obtain
information about the actual effects of pollution and pollution control. If
members of Congress are deciding on the level of risk reduction, they will
not want to do so in a vacuum, especially in light of the significant costs
of large reductions. Affected groups will therefore be encouraged to en-
gage in research about real-world consequences.
Information about consequences frequently remains in its most prelim-
inary stages. The new premium placed on information should be a par-
ticularly important gain. There is every reason to design regulatory
strategies that put a premium on greater research, so that when we act,
we know what we are getting, and at what price.
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All these considerations suggest that economic incentives-favored so
firmly on economic grounds-have as one of their principal justifications
a series of democracy-reinforcing, faction-limiting characteristics.
3. Recent Initiatives
The movement toward economic incentives is preliminary but real.
Thus far, it has occurred mostly in the environmental area. An impor-
tant series of administrative initiatives have brought about "emissions
trading," especially under the Clean Air Act.62 Under the EPA's policy,
a firm that reduces its emissions below legal requirements may obtain
"credits" that can be used against higher emissions elsewhere.
Through the "offset" policy, which is formally codified in the Clean
Air Act, a company may locate in an area not in compliance with na-
tional air quality standards, if and only if it can offset the new emissions
by reducing existing emissions, either from its own sources or from other
firms. Through the "banking" policy, firms are permitted to store emis-
sion credits for their own future use. Companies may also engage in
"netting," by which a firm modifies a source, but avoids the most strin-
gent emissions limits that would otherwise be applied to the modification
by reducing emissions from another source within the same plant.
Through the use of "bubbles," existing sources may place an imaginary
bubble over their plants, allowing each emitting device within the plant
to discharge different emission levels so long as the total emission level is
in compliance with aggregate requirements. We now have a good deal of
evidence about the emissions trading program.
For various reasons, the use of the program has been quite limited.63
A study in 1986 showed 42 federal bubbles; 90 state bubbles; 2,000 fed-
eral offsets; between 5,000 and 12,000 acts of netting; and 100 acts of
banking. 61 Despite this limited activity, there is considerable evidence
that this policy has been successful. Overall, the program has produced
savings of between $525 million and $12 billion.65 By any measure, this
is an enormous gain.
On balance, the environmental consequences have been beneficial. Off-
sets must, by definition, produce environmental gains. The preliminary
evidence shows favorable effects from bubbles as well.66 There may be
62. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement: General Principles for Creation, Banking,
and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (1986).
63. See Dudek & Palmisano, Emissions Trading.- Why is This Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217 (1988).
64. See Hahn & Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 361, 374 table 2 (1989).
65. See id.
66. Id. at 375.
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modest beneficial effects from banking and modest adverse effects from
netting.67 The overall environmental effect is therefore good, with cost
entirely to one side.
The EPA has also permitted emissions trading for lead. Under this
policy, a refinery that produced gasoline with lower than required lead
levels could earn credits. These could be traded with other refineries or
banked for future use.68 Until the termination of the program in 1987,
when the phaseout of lead ended, emissions credits for lead were widely
traded. EPA concluded that there had been cost savings of about twenty
percent over alternative systems, marking total savings in the hundreds
of million of dollars. 69 There have been initial administrative efforts as
well with respect to water pollution and ozone depletion.7 °
The most dramatic program of economic incentives can be found in
the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act. The Act now explicitly cre-
ates an emissions trading system for the control of acid deposition. In
these amendments, Congress has made an explicit decision about aggre-
gate emissions level for a pollutant.7 ' Whether the particular decision is
correct may be disputed. But surely there are large democratic benefits
from ensuring that public attention is focussed on that issue.
There are other beneficial features to the acid deposition provisions.
Congress has said that polluters may obtain allowances for emissions
avoided through energy conservation and the use of renewable energy
sources. In this way, avoidance of this kind is turned into dollars, in the
form of increased permission to pollute. 72 This provision creates an in-
centive to shift to conservation and renewable sources, without providing
further environmental degradation.
Moreover, polluters are explicitly permitted to trade their allowances;
this is a first in national legislative regulation.73 In this way, people who
are able to reduce their pollution below the specified level receive eco-
nomic benefits. Again incentives are created for environmentally benefi-
cial behavior. An especially intriguing provision allows spot and advance
sales of sulfur dioxide allowances, purchasable at $1,500 per ton.74
67. Id. at 374.
68. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.20(d), (e) (1990).
69. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING LEAD
IN GASOLINE, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS VIII-31 (Feb. 1985); see also Hahn &
Hester, supra note 64, at 387.
70. On ozone depletion, see 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82)
(final rule promulgated Aug. 12, 1988); on water pollution, see Hahn & Stavins, Incentive-
Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era From an Old Idea, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 18-19
(1991).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651c, 7651d, 7651o (Supp. 1991).
72. Id. § 7651c(f)(2).
73. Id. § 765 lb(b).
74. Id. § 7651o(c).
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Through this route, polluters must-for the first time-pay a fee for their
pollution. Even more intriguing is a provision calling for auction sales of
specified numbers of sulfur dioxide allowances.75 Here the market is per-
mitted to set the price for polluting activity.
For the most part, however, the Clean Air Act does not require pol-
luters to pay for their "licenses." Instead, government continues to per-
mit them to pollute for free. This is a large obstacle to a sensible system
of regulation. In the future, Congress should build on the acid deposition
model, requiring payments by polluters and others who inflict social
harm.
C. Decentralization
1. Efficiency
Under current law, national standards are set both for the environ-
ment and for workplace safety and health. 76 But as we have seen, the
costs and benefits of regulatory activity are widely variable across both
time and space. Consider, for example, the issue of clean air. To require
the same level of ambient air quality in Los Angeles and Wyoming makes
little sense in light of the fact that the costs (and benefits) of achieving
that level vary so dramatically. Uniform controls seem implausible if
Wyoming has already attained a level of X, and if Los Angeles could not
do so without suffering profound economic dislocations-including, for
example, ceasing use of the automobile. Such controls would be grotes-
quely inefficient.
Return to the area of workplace safety. It has been proposed that the
current system of collective bargaining should be replaced by nationally-
mandated minimum standards.77 In fact, the OSHA now imposes a wide
range of national requirements for both safety and health. But surely
American workers do not agree about the appropriate tradeoffs among
health, wages, medical benefits, and jobs. Some employees are willing to
subject themselves to greater risks in return for greater benefits.7" Others
seek low level risks, and are willing to take lower salaries in return.79
75. Id. § 7651o(d).
76. In the absence of federal preemption, however, states and private actors may increase
protection above the national level.
77. See Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Cur-
rent State of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012 (1984).
78. See W. Kip Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE (1983).
79. It is common at this point to express concern with the decision to trade safety for a
lower salary. To some extent, the concern is misplaced, since safety is not an absolute, and
since tradeoffs among important social goods, including safety, are a part of any imaginable
human life. To some extent the concern may point to a good argument for redistribution of
resources, so that people are not faced with such hard choices. But a bar to the preferred (even
if hard) choice is not the same as redistribution.
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Just as consumers make safety-related tradeoffs in the purchase of con-
sumer goods, such as cars, so workers differ in the employment market.
In these circumstances, nationally mandated standards are inefficient.
They are ill-matched to the extraordinary diversity of worker values and
preferences. It would be far better to allow a degree of workplace differ-
ences, matching that diversity. Decentralization would accomplish this
goal.
2. Democracy
If our goal is increased democratization, it is indispensable to promote
more decentralization. In the area of workplace safety, for example,
democratic solutions cannot be achieved at the national level. The mar-
ket mechanism of "exit"-permitting dissatisfied workers to leave-
might well be accompanied by the political mechanism of "voice," by
which workers participate in workplace governance.80 In order for that
latter mechanism to operate, it is crucial that workplace conditions be
decided at the local level. Opportunities for greater decentralization are
thus part and parcel of the process of democratizing the employment
market.
In the area of environmental protection, it is also possible to
strengthen state and local options, and precisely in the interest of democ-
ratization. We might, for example, permit dramatic variations with re-
spect to air and water quality, accompanied by national "floors" designed
to take account of interstate effects. Federal laws should be written to
minimize preemption of different state solutions. Judge-made preemp-
tion doctrines should be designed to require a clear congressional state-
ment before allowing such preemption.
Moreover, the national government might encourage the provision of
information to states and localities to allow them to decide how to deal
with such problems as release of toxic wastes. Through all these routes,
the democratic process at the local level might be strengthened, thus pro-
moting what is, as a practical matter, the only way to promote more
citizen engagement with governmental affairs.
3. Current Initiatives
Here too a number of initial steps have been taken in the right direc-
tion. The "New Federalism" of the 1970s and 1980s has modestly con-
tributed to a reinvigoration of state authority. 1 We have seen a dramatic
80. See A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970) (discussing "exit" and
"voice" remedies).
81. See generally ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
(ACIR), REGULATORY FEDERALISM: POLICY, PROCESS, IMPACT, AND REFORM 19-21
(1984) (Washington, D.C.).
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growth in regulatory activity at the state level. Recycling programs are
now common. Sometimes fees are required for disposal of solid waste-
an application of the basic principle that "polluters pay." Six states now
maintain programs for the reduction of sources of solid waste. California
has been especially inventive, adopting programs for reduction of toxic
substances" and, perhaps most dramatically, for reducing air pollution
in the badly polluted Los Angeles area. The latter program will require
conversion of all cars to electric power or other "clean" fuels by 2007;
other provisions will encourage public transportation and limit the use of
automobiles.8
North Carolina has adopted a "pollution prevention program"
designed to prevent pollution before it occurs, rather than to impose
technology at the end of the pipe. These are simply a few of the many
respects in which recent initiatives have begun to implement Justice
Brandeis' aspiration that the states might serve as "laboratories" experi-
menting with different systems for attaining social goals. 4
Nor has the national government been inactive in this area. 5 Under
EPCRKA, discussed above, information about the toxic chemical emis-
sions must be provided to the states. The resulting information has been
used as the foundation for a wide range of laws at the state level.86 Ore-
gon now requires pollution reduction goals, as does Massachusetts.
States have used the inventory as a basis for enforcement activity. Other
national initiatives might similarly act as a spur for state and local
decisions.
IV. QUALIFICATIONS
There are some important qualifications to the arguments I have made
thus far. Informational strategies, economic incentives, and decentraliza-
tion have genuine limitations. In some cases, these approaches are inade-
quate. I outline some of the relevant considerations.
A. The Limits of Information
There are two problems with informational strategies. First, the provi-
sion of information is expensive. Second, the provision of information is
sometimes ineffectual or even counterproductive.
82. See Viscusi, Predicting the Effects of Food Cancer Warnings on Consumers, 43 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 283 (1988).
83. See Lester, A New Federalism? Environmental Policy in the States, in ENVIRONMEN-
TAL POLICY IN THE 1990s: TOWARD A NEW AGENDA 59, 62 (N. Vig & M. Kraft eds. 1991).
84. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
85. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 14, at xxviii-xxix.
86. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS, TOXIC CHEMICALS
(1991).
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Consider, for example, the fact that the government estimates the cost
of the new FDA rules at no less $1.7 billion over twenty years. The
president of the National Food Processors Association claims that the
first year costs alone will exceed $2 billion.87 In either case, the cost is
high. OSHA's hazard communication policy is estimated to save 200
lives per year-a lot-but at an annual cost of $360 million."8 The ex-
penditure per life saved is therefore $1.8 million. This is far better than a
large number of regulations, and an amount well worth spending; but it
is more than many agencies spend for life-saving regulations. It is there-
fore not the case that the OSHA rule stands out as a means of saving
lives especially cheaply.
When informational strategies are costly, there are two possible re-
sponses. The first is to do nothing. If the savings-in terms of health,
life, informed choice-are relatively low, costly strategies, even informa-
tional ones, make little sense. There will therefore be circumstances in
which a government remedy for an absence of information is
unwarranted.
The second possibility is to impose a regulatory strategy rather than to
require disclosure. By a regulatory strategy, I mean a mandatory out-
come, such as a flat ban on the materials in question, or governmental
specification of a particular outcome, as in a mandated maximum level of
carcinogens in the workplace. Sometimes the regulatory strategy will be
cheaper, because the price of disclosing information-changing packag-
ing and so forth-is so high. This is likely to be the right response when
most or all people would respond to the information in the same way. In
that case, it is unnecessary to provide information, and better simply to
dictate an outcome that, by hypothesis, is generally preferred. For an
especially dangerous substance, one that reasonable people would not
choose to encounter, a flat ban is appropriate.
Even when informational strategies are not prohibitively expensive,
they may be ineffectual, and thus have low benefits. People have limited
ability to process information.8" They have a notoriously difficult time in
thinking about low-probability events. Sometimes they discount such
events to zero; sometimes they treat them as much more dangerous than
they actually are. If people are told, for example, that a certain sub-
stance causes cancer, they may think that it is far more dangerous than it
is in fact. But some carcinogenic substances pose little risk.
For example, California's Proposition 65, an initiative designed to pro-
mote citizen awareness of risk levels, requires warnings for exposure to
87. Chicago Tribune, Nov. 7, 1991, at 2.
88. See Morrall, supra note 27.
89. See generally JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER
(H. Arkes & K. Hammond eds. 1986).
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carcinogens. At first glance the requirement seems unexceptionable, in-
deed an important advance. But it has in some cases been counter-
productive. Consumers appear to think that twelve of every 100 users of
a product with the required warning will die from cancer. This estimate
exceeds reality by a factor of 1000 or more.' With respect to informa-
tion, less may be more. If information is not provided in a clear and
usable form, it may actually make people less knowledgeable than they
were before. The Truth-in-Lending Act has suffered from this
problem.9
The problem is aggravated by the fact that people tend to use heuristic
devices that produce systemic errors. A particular problem here is the
"availability heuristic," in accordance with which people tend to think
an event is probable if they can readily bring to mind memories of its
occurrence. Thus, for example, an airplane disaster will be thought rela-
tively probable, whereas a death from diabetes will not be. There is a
good deal of evidence that people overestimate risks from highly visible
or sensational causes, but underestimate risks from less dramatic ones.92
There is evidence as well of another problem for informational strate-
gies: people often believe themselves to be immune from risks that they
acknowledge are significant and real with respect to others. 93 In one
study, for example, ninety-seven percent of those surveyed ranked them-
selves as average or above average in their ability to avoid both bicycle
and power mower accidents.94 Disclosure of information may be an un-
helpful tool when people do not internalize the new data.
There is also evidence that people feel frustrated and frightened by
probabilistic information, and greatly prefer a certain answer. The desire
to reduce cognitive dissonance may prevent people from recognizing that
risks are real even when information is provided.9" The same desire may
undermine efforts to provide risk information when the truth is that peo-
ple must inevitably operate under conditions of uncertainty. This desire
may also prevent people from recognizing that conditions are dangerous
even in the face of solid information to this effect.
90. See Viscusi, Predicting the Effects of Food Cancer Risk Warnings on Consumers, in
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER, supra note 89, at
283.
91. See Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80
GEO. L.J. 233, 235-36 (1991) (consumers have difficulty processing information from required
publications of annual percentage rates).
92. See Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Informing the Public About the Risks from Ioniz-
ing Radiation, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (H.
Arkes & K. Hammond eds. 1986).
93. Id. at 116.
94. Id.
95. See Akerlof & Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM.
ECON. REV. 307 (1982).
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There is a pervasive risk of information overload, causing consumers
to treat a large amount of information as equivalent to no information at
all.96 Finally, initially held beliefs are not easy to modify, even when new
information, undermining those beliefs, has been presented. 97
Yet another problem is that disclosure requirements may have unan-
ticipated adverse effects. For example, companies may respond to disclo-
sure requirements by refusing to provide information at all (if this is an
available option). The result will be the removal from the market of in-
formation that is useful overall. If industry responds to a requirement of
evidentiary support for scientific claims with mere "puffing," consumers
may have less information than they did to begin with. If advertisers
must conduct extensive tests before they are permitted to make claims,
they will be given a strong incentive to avoid making claims at all.98
Finally, information may be an inadequate strategy where greater
safety is a public good.99 Imagine, for example, that the replacement of
carcinogen X with safe product Y would benefit all workers simultane-
ously. Imagine, too, that each worker is bargaining separately with the
employer. In that case, no individual employee would have a sufficient
incentive to decrease his demand for wages and other benefits to obtain
increased safety. Because the benefits of the new substance would be pro-
vided to everyone, no individual employee would "pay" enough to obtain
them, preferring instead to take a free ride on the efforts of others. The
result will be too little safety on conventional economic criteria. Here a
regulatory response is appropriate.
All this suggests that there are real limitations to informational strate-
gies. These limitations should, however, be taken merely as qualifica-
tions of the broader point, or as providing helpful guidance to those
seeking to design effective information requirements. They do not bear
fundamentally on reform efforts.
The first and most important point is that some of these very limita-
tions can be overcome through more and better information. An aware-
ness of the distorting effects of current heuristics can help overcome
those effects; general publicity about those effects might therefore supply
a corrective. In addition, well-tailored programs would minimize the rel-
evant risks by putting the information in its most understandable form.
96. See Jacoby, Nelson & Hoyer, Corrective Advertising and Affirmative Disclosure State-
ments Their Potential for Confusing and Misleading the Consumer, J. MARKETING, Winter
1982, at 61, 70.
97. Id. at 118.
98. See Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U.L. REv. 657 (1985).
99. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 33, at 356. This argument depends for its plausibility
on transactions cost barriers to free mobility of labor. If labor were completely mobile, the
problem should disappear.
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Instead of labelling a substance a "carcinogen," a uniform system of risk
regulation could give better awareness of risk levels. While informational
strategies are no panacea, they would accomplish considerable good, at
least if the possible obstacles are kept firmly in mind.
B. When Economic Incentives Fail
There are several possible problems with the use of economic incen-
tives. The clearest cases arise when the appropriate response to a harm-
producing activity is a flat ban. With an especially dangerous pollutant,
an increased price is inadequate. The pollutant should be eliminated
from the market, at least if its social benefits do not outweigh the relevant
danger and less dangerous substitutes are available. But if a flat ban is
not desirable, there should be a strong presumption in favor of economic
incentives.
Another problem is that economic incentives might be thought to op-
erate as a regressive tax, in the sense that they raise prices in general, and
the rise will come down especially hard on the poor. An increase in the
price of gasoline, or in the cost of high-polluting vehicles, will make
things more difficult for poor people in particular. Indeed, any effort to
require manufacturers and sellers to "internalize" the costs of their pro-
duction might seem objectionable insofar as it increases prices in a way
especially hard on the indigent.
In general, I do not believe that this objection is persuasive.'0 0 Any
regulatory solution will increase prices; economic incentives are not dis-
tinctive in this regard. And if the solution is otherwise sensible, it ought
not to be treated as a "regressive tax," any more than the pricing system
itself is a regressive tax. Moreover, a refusal to require enterprises to
bear the social costs of their activities is hardly an effective way of bene-
fiting the poor. The class of people burdened by this refusal includes
many people not poor at all; and the refusal burdens many poor people.
It is certainly correct, however, to worry about the consequences of
price increases, produced by market forces or by government, for poor
people. The point suggests that the taxes or fines produced by economic
incentives might be accompanied by subsidies or transfer payments to
people who are needy. Some of these subsidies might be funded out of
the very revenues produced by the program itself.
It is also possible to argue, as against economic incentives, that they
improperly "commodify" certain interests. Perhaps some such inter-
ests-the right to bodily integrity, the right to freedom from pollution-
ought not to be traded on markets at all. Perhaps such trading debases
and diminishes the interests in question, with harmful consequences for
100. See Sunstein, Administrative Substance, supra note 2.
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social attitudes.'01
In some settings the objection seems plausible. Thus there is reason to
question a decision to allow trading of body parts, or of gestational ca-
pacities. But in the general context of regulatory law, it is doubtful that
the argument takes one very far. It seems implausible to suggest that
social attitudes would be materially changed by a system in which pol-
luters and others who cause harm must pay. Indeed, a shift of the enti-
tlement from the polluter to the pollutee might have desirable effects on
social attitudes, by establishing the correct starting point. 10 2 In any case,
it seems far better to require people who cause harm to pay, rather than
to allow them to do so for free.
Any incentive-based system must confront a range of practical
problems. In the environmental context, for example, there is a risk that
polluters will cluster in a particular area, thus subjecting people in that
area to unacceptably high danger.'o 3 Determining the amount of any tax
or fine is not a simple scientific exercise. It entails a democratic judgment
about appropriate risk levels, and that decision will pose great difficulties.
But these sorts of questions should be treated as matters of detail. They
do not bear fundamentally on the shift to economic incentives.
C. National Commitments
Decentralization is not a preferred approach in at least three categories
of cases. The first involves national moral commitments that cut across
local boundaries. The most obvious candidates here are the prohibition
on discrimination on the basis of race and sex. Here decentralized solu-
tions are inadequate. The whole point of the national commitment is to
ensure adherence to a principle that transcends state boundaries. The
Civil War, establishing a prohibition on slavery and a requirement of
racial equality, is the core example.
The second category involves interstate spillovers, of which air pollu-
tion is the most conspicuous example. Because air pollution in California
will affect Nevada, we cannot rely entirely on intrastate controls. There
are inadequate political safeguards in one state against the imposition of
harms on another. In such cases, national intervention is necessary.
101. In the environmental context, see S. KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? (1981); on
commodification in general, see Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849
(1987).
102. On the relationships between preferences and initial allocations of entitlements, see,
e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); see also Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and
Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 Am. ECON. REV. 1277 (1989); Knetsch &
Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unex-
pected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507 (1984).
103. See S. BREYER, supra note 17.
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Even here, however, such intervention should take the form of "floors"-
minimum standards-rather than nationally dictated outcomes.
The third category is the most interesting. In a federal system, states
compete with each other for revenue-attracting business and industry.
This competition creates an important "race to the bottom" with respect
to regulatory controls. In many respects this is entirely healthy. The
right of exit is a critical check against oppressive law. Indeed, the right
of exit is probably a more important constraint on oppressive legislation
than the Supreme Court's decisions under the dormant commerce clause,
even if all these are taken together.
But the "race" can have unfortunate consequences as well. Suppose,
for example, that state A wishes to impose occupational safety and health
controls--or even disclosure requirements-on industries within its bor-
ders. Suppose that such industries are free to leave. It may well be that
in such circumstances, no state will impose the relevant controls, even
though all states, if agreement were possible, would choose to do so.
President Roosevelt made precisely this argument in supporting child la-
bor legislation at the national level.
In some cases, then, the race to the bottom will put states in a prison-
ers' dilemma, requiring a cooperative solution in the form of a binding
agreement through the national government. Through legislation at the
national level, states can prevent the mutually destructive competition to
attract business and industry.
This argument does not prove as much as might appear. Sometimes
national legislation will not be in the interests of the states' own people,
since it will drive down profits in a way that will have adverse effects on
(among other things) poverty, employment, and the general availability
of goods and services. But national legislation will sometimes be justified
on this ground.
D. Democracy and Markets: Potential for Conflict
In most of this essay, I have argued that economic and democratic
goals can march hand-in-hand. Across a wide range, we can attempt
precisely the same reforms to bring about both of these goals. For this
reason, there is no need to choose between efficiency and democracy, at
least for most of our efforts in the next generation.
It would be a mistake, however, to pretend that there is no potential
for conflict. An exploration of that potential of course raises extremely
large and complex issues. I make only a few brief observations.
The most important point is that efficiency is a function of aggregated
private willingness to pay, a criterion that is, to say the least, problematic
from the democratic point of view. A system is efficient if entitlements
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have been allocated so as to "maximize value," with reference to private
willingness to pay. For believers in a democratic system, however, this
criterion is distorted, and in two ways. First, a democratic system oper-
ates on the principle of one person, one vote. By contrast, a market allo-
cates "votes" in accordance with how much people are willing to pay for
things. Since willingness to pay is a function of ability to pay, rich people
will be willing to pay far more than poor people. Indeed, the indigent
can pay nothing at all. The principle of political equality, so central to
democratic theory, is violated by the efficiency criterion.
Second, a democratic system, at least in America, is not supposed to
represent an effort to aggregate private preferences."° Instead the pro-
cess is a deliberative one, in which different information and perspectives
are brought to bear. In that deliberative process, preferences are sup-
posed to be transformed into values. °5 Markets do not have this
function.
The notion of aggregating private willingness to pay accurately cap-
tures the economic ideal of "consumer sovereignty." But whatever its
value in some contexts, this is a caricature of the American conception of
sovereignty. That conception aspires not to aggregated consumption
choices, but instead to a transfer of the power of governance from the
King to "We the People." Insofar as markets accurately capture private
willingness to pay, they are a powerful tool of prosperity, and on a cer-
tain, not wholly implausible view, of liberty as well. But this salutary
function is not the same as democratic self-governance. The considered
judgments of the citizenry may well diverge from aggregated consump-
tion choices."°c And when there is such a divergence, the former should
generally prevail.
These objections to the willingness to pay criterion, invoking demo-
cratic principles, are hardly irrelevant to the reform of American public
law. They suggest that exclusive use of the principle of cost-benefit anal-
ysis is highly objectionable. They suggest that there will indeed be con-
flicts between democratic aspirations and the goal of economic efficiency.
But if what I have said is persuasive, a great deal can be done before
reaching those conflicts.
104. As social choice theorists have shown, it could not do so even if we wanted it to,
because of the paradoxes created by multimember bodies. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE
AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1955) (discussing these paradoxes).
105. See Pitkin, Justice: Relating Public to Private, in 9 POLITICAL THEORY 327 (1981)
(discussing transformation of preferencing in politics).
106. See Anderson, Values, Risks, and Market Norms, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 54 (1987)
(discussing divergence between democratic outcomes and market choices).
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V. CONCLUSION
Throughout its history, American government has benefited from its
democratic features and from structural characteristics that promote ef-
fectiveness and efficiency. The benefits are especially conspicuous when
viewed in comparison to other governmental systems. But in its current
incarnation, it suffers from significant failures. The modern regulatory
state is often ineffective. It has not been efficient. It is hardly a model of
democratic self-governance. In a period in which nations all over the
world are seeking to promote both efficiency and democracy, it would be
unfortunate indeed if we did not subject our own institutions to skeptical
scrutiny.
In this essay, I have suggested three reforms in contemporary public
law. Information-based strategies, increasing disclosure and education,
should supplement or even displace regulatory systems. Economic in-
centives, including taxes and fines, should substantially displace com-
mand-and-control regulation. Decentralization, allowing bargaining and
participation in the private and public spheres, should in many contexts
be substituted for centralized dictates from Washington. All of these
proposals would respond simultaneously to inefficiencies in modern gov-
ernment and to severe problems from the democratic point of view-
most notably factional influence and absence of opportunities for the ex-
ercise of political influence.
I do not contend that reforms of this sort would accomplish all that is
now required, from the standpoint of either efficiency or democracy.
There are genuine limits to all three strategies. At some point, moreover,
it will be necessary to reconcile some serious conflicts between efficiency
and democracy. But we now have both the information and the tools by
which to accomplish an enormous amount of reform. We need not rest
content with the paradoxes and failures of existing institutions.
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